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Moving Past Michelin: Towards Judicial Reconsideration
of the Intersection of Copyright and the Charter Right to
Freedom of Expression
Graham Reynolds*

On a regular basis over the past two decades, Canadian courts
considering the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of
expression and copyright have cited to Michelin v. CAW-Canada as
authority. In this article, I argue that it is no longer acceptable for
them to do so. As I will establish, the approaches to the intersection of
freedom of expression and copyright employed in Michelin rely upon
and have been shaped by conceptions of copyright and freedom of
expression that, although once endorsed by the Supreme Court of
Canada, are no longer valid, namely the author-centric view of
copyright as well as an approach to freedom of expression under
which it is accepted that property rights are insulated from Charter
scrutiny. As such, the Michelin approaches to the intersection of the
Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright are no longer
good law, and should be explicitly rejected.
_________________________
Au cours des deux dernie`res de´cennies, les tribunaux canadiens
ont fre´quemment fait re´fe´rence à la de´cision rendue dans l’affaire
Michelin c. CAW-Canada comme faisant autorite´ pour trancher des
litiges soulevant à la fois des questions relatives au droit
constitutionnel à la liberte´ d’expression et au droit d’auteur. Dans
cet article, l’auteur pre´tend que cette manie`re de faire n’est plus
acceptable. L’auteur entend ainsi e´tablir que les approches adopte´es
dans l’arreˆt Michelin pour trancher un litige soulevant à la fois des
questions relatives à la liberte´ d’expression et au droit d’auteur ont e´te´
e´labore´es à partir de conceptions du droit d’auteur et de la liberte´
d’expression qui, bien qu’ayant e´te´ un temps avalise´es par la Cour
*
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supreˆme du Canada, ne sont de´sormais plus valides. Ces conceptions
reposaient sur une vision au centre de laquelle se trouvait le titulaire
du droit d’auteur ainsi que sur une approche de la liberte´ d’expression
en vertu de laquelle il e´tait admis que les droits de proprie´te´ ne
devaient pas eˆtre pris en conside´ration dans le cadre d’une analyse
effectue´e en vertu de la Charte. Or, les approches adopte´es dans
l’arreˆt Michelin pour trancher des litiges soulevant à la fois des
questions relatives au droit constitutionnel a` la liberte´ d’expression et
au droit d’auteur ne s’appliquent plus et devraient eˆtre rejete´es du
revers de la main.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, in the context of a unionization drive, representatives of
the National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General
Workers Union of Canada (CAW) created and distributed leaflets
that featured a modified version of Compagnie Générale des
Établissements Michelin — Michelin & Cie’s (CGEM Michelin)
copyrighted corporate logo, the Michelin Tire Man (or
Bibendum).1 In the CAW’s leaflet, Bibendum, ‘‘a beaming
marshmallow-like rotund figure composed of tires,” 2 was
depicted as ‘‘broadly smiling . . . arms crossed, with his foot
raised, seemingly ready to crush underfoot an unsuspecting
Michelin worker.”3
CGEM Michelin, objecting both to this depiction of Bibendum
as well as to the CAW’s unauthorized use of the word ‘‘Michelin”,
brought an action in the Federal Court (Trial Division) against
CAW, Larry Wark (a local CAW representative) and Basil
Hargrove (President of the CAW) (CAW et al.) for both
copyright and trademark infringement.4 As part of their defence,
CAW et al. argued that, should the court determine that their use of
Bibendum constitutes copyright infringement, then it should also
determine that certain core sections of the Copyright Act

1

2
3
4

Compagnie Ge´ne´rale des Établissements Michelin — Michelin & Cie v. National
Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada
(CAW-Canada), 1996 CarswellNat 2297, [1997] 2 F.C. 306 at [2] (F.C.T.D.).
Ibid. at [2].
Ibid. at [2] and [8].
Ibid. at [2].
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unjustifiably infringe the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression, as
protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Charter).5
In his judgment, Teitelbaum J., having determined that the
defendants had infringed CGEM Michelin’s copyright, reached
what he referred to as the ‘‘seemingly straightforward” conclusion
that ‘‘[t]he Charter does not confer the right to use private property
— the plaintiff’s copyright — in the service of freedom of
expression.”6 He also held, in the alternative, that even if he were
to have determined that the impugned provisions of the Copyright
Act infringed the Charter right to freedom of expression, that the
infringement would be justified under a section 1 analysis.7
Over 20 years have passed since Teitelbaum J.’s judgment in
Compagnie Ge´ne´rale des Établissements Michelin — Michelin & Cie
v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General
Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) (Michelin) was handed
down. Despite this passage of time, however, as well as its status as
a trial level decision, Michelin continues to loom large over the
intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright in Canada. Since Michelin was handed down in 1996,
eight decisions by Canadian courts have referenced the intersection
of the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright.8 In five
5

6
7
8

Ibid. at [3]; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
Michelin at [79].
Ibid. at [109].
Productions Avandi Cine´ Vide´o Inc. c. Favreau, 1999 CarswellQue 2742, 177
D.L.R. (4th) 568, 1 C.P.R. (4th) 129, [1999] R.J.Q. 1939 (Cour d’appel du
Québec); Fraser Health Authority v. Hospital Employees’ Union, 2003 BCSC
807, 2003 CarswellBC 1251, 226 D.L.R. (4th) 563, 25 C.P.R. (4th) 172 (B.C.
S.C.); Corporation Sun Me´dia c. Syndicat canadien de la function publique, 2007
QCCS 2943, 2007 CarswellQue 5486 (Cour supérieure du Québec); Canwest
Mediaworks Publications Inc. v. Horizon Publications Ltd., 2008 BCSC 1609,
2008 CarswellBC 2512; Canwest Mediaworks Publications Inc. v. Horizon
Publications Ltd., 2009 BCSC 391; Drolet v. Stiftung Gralsbotschaft (F.C.),
2009 FC 17, [2010] 1 F.C.R. 492, [2010] 1 R.C.F. 492, 2009 CarswellNat 1563
(Federal Court); Robinson c. Films Cinar inc., 2009 QCCS 3793, 2009
CarswellQue 8380, 83 C.P.R. (4th 1) (Cour supérieure du Québec); Dish
Network L.L.C. v. Rex, 2011 BCSC 1105, 2011 CarswellBC 2124 (B.C. S.C.).
The order granted in Robinson c. Films Cinar inc. was appealed, and the case was
ultimately decided by the SCC as Cinar Corporation v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73
(S.C.C.). Although the SCC decision did discuss other rights protected under
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of these decisions (handed down in 2003, 2008, 2009, 2009 and
2011, respectively), courts have cited to Michelin as authority for
the proposition that provisions of the Copyright Act are either
consistent with,9 or do not unjustifiably infringe,10 the Charterprotected right to freedom of expression; or that ‘‘a Charter right to
freedom of expression cannot be used to compel private property to
be used as a forum for expression.”11
In this article, I argue that, with respect to its treatment of the
intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright, Michelin is no longer good law, and that, as a result, it is
inappropriate for Canadian courts considering the intersection of
the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright to
continue to rely on Michelin as authority.12 As I will establish, the
approaches to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of
expression and copyright employed by Teitelbaum J. in Michelin
rely upon and have been shaped by conceptions of copyright and
freedom of expression that, although once endorsed by the
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), are no longer valid. As a
result, the Michelin approaches to the intersection of the Charter
right to freedom of expression and copyright — to the extent to
which they employ these now-abandoned conceptions of both
copyright and of freedom of expression — should themselves be
rejected.
This article proceeds as follows. In Part 2, I introduce the
intersection of copyright and the Charter right to freedom of

9

10
11
12

the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12, namely the
rights to inviolability, dignity, and peaceful enjoyment and free disposition of
property, none of the proceedings related to Robinson c. Films Cinar inc.,
including the SCC decision, reference the intersection of the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright.
Fraser Health Authority v. Hospital Employees’ Union at [49]; Canwest 2008 at
[13]; Drolet v. Stiftung Gralsbotschaft (F.C.) at [187]; Robinson c. Films Cinar
inc. at [1098].
Canwest 2008 at [13]; Drolet v. Stiftung Gralsbotschaft (F.C.) at [187].
Dish Network 2011 at [183].
Paul LeBel writes that the question of whether a decision is ‘‘‘good law’ . . . is
primarily an inquiry about whether the decision is currently valid, in the sense of
being capable of exerting some binding or persuasive effect on the decision of
future cases.” Paul A. LeBel, ‘‘An Interested Response to a ‘Wholly
Disinterested Assessment’: LeBel on Summers on LeBel on Summers on . . . Er
. . . Um . . . Oh, Yeah . . . Fuller” (1987) 85:8 Mich. L. Rev. 1914 at 1915.
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expression. In Part 3, I describe how Canadian courts’ views of the
correct conceptions of both copyright and of freedom of expression
have shifted over time, from an author-centric view of copyright to
one that balances between copyright owners’ rights, users’ rights
and the public interest; and from a conception of freedom of
expression under which it is accepted that property rights are
insulated from the operation of the Charter, to a conception of
freedom of expression under which expression taking place on
private property is only excluded from the operation of the Charter
in the absence of government action.13 In Part 4, I introduce the
two approaches to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom
of expression and copyright employed by Teitelbaum J. in Michelin.
I argue that both of these approaches rely on or have been shaped
by the now-rejected conceptions of copyright and of freedom of
expression described above, and that, as a result, the Michelin
approaches to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of
expression and copyright should themselves be rejected. Part 5
concludes the article.
2. THE INTERSECTION OF THE CHARTER RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND COPYRIGHT: CASES,
CONTEXT, AND COMMENTARY
Canada’s copyright laws support and encourage expression in a
number of ways, including by providing authors with exclusive,
transferable and enforceable economic rights in works that they
create, from which they can derive income;14 by granting authors
both attribution rights as well as the right to enjoin certain uses of
their works (thus providing protection both for authors’ economic
as well as their moral interests);15 and by creating an economic
incentive for publishers as well as other intermediaries to
disseminate works of expression.16
At the same time, however, Canada’s copyright laws restrict
expression. For instance, absent the successful invocation of a
defence to copyright infringement, non-copyright owning parties
13

14
15
16

Montreal (Ville) v. 2952-1366 Que´bec inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, 2005 SCC 62 at
[62].
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 at ss. 3, 5.
Ibid. at ss. 14.1, 14.2, 27, 28.1, 28.2.
Ibid. at ss. 13(4), 13(7).
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are not legally permitted to express themselves by reproducing a
copyrighted work in whole or substantial part; performing it in
public; or making it available online, among other acts.17
Given the different ways in which copyright both supports and
restricts expression, the question of whether provisions of Canada’s
Copyright Act are consistent with the Charter right to freedom of
expression is one that is important for courts to consider. Michelin,
however, remains the only Canadian judicial decision to have
engaged with the intersection of freedom of expression and
copyright in any significant depth.18
The lack of attention paid by Canadian courts to this
intersection is problematic. In many jurisdictions, including
Canada, copyright has been invoked to silence criticism of

17
18

Ibid. at ss. 3, 27.
This is not to say that Michelin was the first Canadian judicial decision to
consider the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright. The first case to consider this intersection was Queen v. James
Lorimer & Co., [1982] F.C.J. No. 229 (F.C.T.D.). Prior to Michelin, this
intersection was also considered in Queen v. James Lorimer & Co. (1983), [1984]
1 F.C. 1065; Canadian Tire Corp. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1518 (1985), 7
C.P.R. (3d) 415, 1985 CarswellNat 800 (F.C.T.D.); Rôtisseries St.-Hubert Lte´e
v. Le Syndicat des Travailleurs(euses) de la Roˆtisserie St.-Hubert de Drummondville (C.S.N.) (1986), 17 C.P.R. (3d) 461; and R. v. Ghnaim (1988), 92 A.R.
27. As well, despite having discussed copyright and Charter values in the context
of a decision focusing on the correct interpretation to be given to a provision of
the Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2 (Bell ExpressVu Limited
Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42); copyright and the rights
to inviolability, dignity, peaceful enjoyment and free disposition of property, as
protected under the Québec Charter (Cinar); and publication and freedom of
expression in the context of a case involving defamation and hyperlinks (an
issue that can be seen as connected to copyright) (Crookes v. Newton, [2011] 3
S.C.R. 269); and despite having referenced Michelin (for other purposes) in
The´berge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 2002 SCC
34, the SCC has yet to explicitly consider the intersection of the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright. In Graham Reynolds, ‘‘The Limits of
Statutory Interpretation: Towards Explicit Engagement, by the Supreme Court
of Canada, with the Charter Right to Freedom of Expression in the Context of
Copyright” (2016) 41 Queen’s L.J. 455, I offer several explanations to account
for why the SCC has not yet explicitly considered this intersection.
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governments,19 corporations,20 institutions,21 and individuals;22 to
suppress the release of documents;23 and to chill creative expression
that incorporates copyrighted expression.24
19

20

21

22

23

24

Craig highlights ‘‘copyright’s historical beginnings as a tool of censorship, a
means of suppressing religious and political dissent” (Carys J. Craig, ‘‘Putting
the Community in Communication: Dissolving the Conflict Between Freedom
of Expression and Copyright” (2006) 56 U.T.L.J. 75 at 87). See also Stephanie
Ip, ‘‘Abbotsford shamed by WordPress for trying to remove parody city logo”
Vancouver Sun (May 27, 2017), online: <http://vancouversun.com/news/localnews/abbotsford-shamed-by-wordpress-for-trying-to-remove-parody-citylogo>; Maira Sutton, ‘‘Copyright Law as a Tool for State Censorship of the
Internet” Electronic Frontier Foundation (December 3, 2014), oneline:
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/12/copyright-law-tool-state-internetcensorship>; Katitza Rodriguez, ‘‘Leaked Documents Confirm Ecuador’s
Internet Censorship Machine” Electronic Frontier Foundation (April 14, 2016),
online: <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/leaked-documents-confirmecuadors-internet-censorship-machine>.
Scassa writes that ‘‘[c]opyright law has emerged as the corporate weapon of
choice in labour disputes and against other critics” (Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Intellectual
Property on the Cyber-Picket Line: A Comment on British Columbia
Automobile Assn v Office and Professional Employees’ International Union,
Local 378” (2002) 39 Alta. L. Rev. 934 at 962). See also Wendy Seltzer, ‘‘Free
Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA
on the First Amendment” (2010) 24 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 171; Mike Masnick,
‘‘Brazilian Media Giant Realizes It Can Use the DMCA to Censor Criticism of
Its Coverage” Techdirt, online: <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20160426/12235534281/brazilian-media-giant-realizes-it-can-use-dmca-tocensor-criticism-coverage.shtml>.
See, for instance, Seltzer at 215; Lydia Pallas Loren, ‘‘Deterring Abuse of the
Copyright Takedown Regime by Taking Misrepresentation Claims Seriously”
(2011) 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 745 at 747.
See, for instance, David Fewer, ‘‘Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of
Expression and the Limits of Copyright in Canada” (1997) 55 U.T. Fac. L. Rev.
175 at 197; Mike Masnick, ‘‘Copyright as Censorship: How Howard Hughes
Used Copyright to Try to Block Biography He Didn’t Like” Techdirt (May 13,
2011), online: <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110325/01002913621/
copyright-as-censorship-how-howard-hughes-used-copyright-to-try-to-blockbiography-he-didnt-like.shtml>.
See, for instance, Fraser Health Authority v. Hospital Employees’ Union;
Commonwealth v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd.; Seltzer at 214-15 and 222-24; Loren
at 747.
Bailey writes that ‘‘often over-reaching claims of infringement threaten to
circumscribe the raw material available to often less advantaged artists, authors
and other would-be creators” (Jane Bailey, ‘‘Deflating the Michelin Man” in
Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest (Irwin Law, 2005) at 153). See, for
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The question of copyright’s constitutionality is particularly
important for Canadian courts to consider given three related
factors: recent amendments to Canada’s Copyright Act that, in
different ways, both expand and limit the rights of copyright
owners and users;25 the development and dissemination of
technologies that both facilitate and guard against the
unauthorized use of copyrighted expression, and which therefore
impact the relationship between rights-holders and other parties;26
and the ongoing evolution of Canadian copyright jurisprudence
and freedom of expression jurisprudence.27 These developments
should cause courts to question whether conclusions reached more
than 20 years ago with respect to the intersection of the Charter
right to freedom of expression and copyright are still valid today.
For many years, the lack of judicial engagement with the
intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright was mirrored by a lack of academic commentary
addressing this topic. The first paper to explore the intersection
of the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright was
published in 1990, a full 20 years after seminal works on the
intersection of copyright and the First Amendment were published
in the United States of America.28

25

26

27
28

instance, ‘‘Gone with the Wind Done Gone: ‘Re-writing and Fair Use’” (2002)
115 Harv. L. Rev. 1193; John Tehranian, ‘‘The New (c)ensorship” (2015) 101
Iowa L. Rev. 245; Graham Reynolds, ‘‘Towards a Right to Engage in the Fair
Transformative Use of Copyright-Protected Expression” in Michael Geist, ed.,
From ‘‘Radical Extremism” to ‘‘Balanced Copyright” (Irwin Law, 2010).
See, for instance, the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20; Economic
Action Plan 2015 Act, No. 1, S.C. 2015, c. 36, s. 82; An Act to Amend the
Copyright Act (Access to Copyrighted Works or Other Subject-Matter for
Persons With Perceptual Disabilities), S.C. 2016, c. 4.
See, for instance, Jacob Kastrenakes & James Vincent, ‘‘A Brief History of
Popcorn Time, the Piracy Service Everyone’s Watching” The Verge (October
23, 2015), online: <www.theverge.com/2015/10/23/9600576/popcorn-timehistory-timeline>; Google, ‘‘How Content ID Works”, online: <support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370>; Taylor Bartholomew, ‘‘The Death of
Fair Use in Cyberspace: YouTube and the Problem with Content ID” (2014) 13
Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 66.
See Part 3 of this article.
Joe Conforti, ‘‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression: A Privilege for New[s]
Reports” (1990) 5 I.P.J. 130.
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Beginning in the late 1990s, however, a number of academics
including David Fewer,29 Ysolde Gendreau,30 Sunny Handa,31
Carys Craig,32 Jane Bailey,33 Abraham Drassinower,34 Teresa
Scassa,35 Bita Amani,36 Sarah Sklar-Heyn,37 David Vaver,38 and
myself 39 began to pay increasing attention to the intersection of the
Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright.
29
30

31

32

33
34

35
36

37

38

39

Fewer.
Ysolde Gendreau, ‘‘Canadian Copyright Law and its Charters” in Jonathan
Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen, eds., Copyright and Free Speech (Oxford
University Press, 2005); Ysolde Gendreau, ‘‘Copyright and Freedom of
Expression in Canada” in Paul Torremans, ed., Copyright and Human Rights
(Kluwer Law International, 2004).
Sunny Handa, Copyright Law in Canada (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2002)
at 95.
Craig; Carys J. Craig, Copyright, Communication and Culture: Towards a
Relational Theory of Copyright Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011).
Bailey.
Abraham Drassinower, ‘‘Copyright Infringement as Compelled Speech” in
Annabelle Lever, ed., New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property
(Cambridge, 2012) at 203; Abraham Drassinower, What’s Wrong with Copying?
(Harvard University Press, 2015).
Scassa.
Bita Amani, ‘‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression: Fair Dealing Between
Work and Play” in Rosemary J. Coombe, Darren Wershler & Martin Zellinger,
eds., Dynamic Fair Dealing: Creating Canadian Culture Online (University of
Toronto Press, 2013).
Sarah Sklar-Heyn, ‘‘Battling Clearance Culture Shock: Comparing US Fair
Use and Canadian Fair Dealing in Advancing Freedom of Expression in NonFiction Film” (2011) 20 Cardozo J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 233.
David Vaver, ‘‘User Rights” (2013) 25 I.P.J. 105; David Vaver, ‘‘Copyright
Defences as User Rights” (2013) 60 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 661.
In Graham Reynolds, ‘‘Reconsidering Copyright’s Constitutionality” (2016)
53 O.H.L.J. 898, relying on the hypothetical case of copyright term extension, I
argue that ‘‘based on current copyright and Charter jurisprudence, a Canadian
court could determine that provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act unjustifiably
infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression” (900); In Reynolds, ‘‘The
Limits of Statutory Interpretation: Towards Explicit Engagement, by the
Supreme Court of Canada, with the Charter Right to Freedom of Expression in
the Context of Copyright”, I argue that ‘‘[d]espite the positive outcomes for the
expression interests of non-copyright owning parties that have thus far resulted
from the SCC’s post-2002 copyright jurisprudence, . . . the SCC should, where
appropriate, explicitly engage with the Charter right to freedom of expression in
the context of copyright” (458).
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Several of the works written by these authors are critical of
Teitelbaum J.’s judgment in Michelin. Some critiques focus on
Teitelbaum J.’s approach to copyright. For instance, Scassa
critiques the way in which Teitelbaum J. ‘‘conflated” Michelin’s
‘‘corporate logo . . . with the works of more traditional creative
artists.”40 As well, both Scassa and Craig are critical of the way in
which Teitelbaum J. ‘‘treat[ed] copyright as simply another species
of private property.”41 Craig and Bailey are also critical of the way
in which Teitelbaum J., in his judgment, failed to ‘‘distinguish
between intellectual and real property rights.”42
A number of criticisms have also been levelled at Teitelbaum J.’s
approach to freedom of expression. Scassa, for instance, is critical
of the way in which Teitelbaum J. ‘‘privileg[ed] . . . private rights
over freedom of expression.”43 As well, Bailey is critical of the way
in which Teitelbaum J.’s decision ‘‘presupposes an existing property
right in copyright material against which incursions for purposes of
exercising freedom of expression must be justified,” arguing both
that there are ‘‘solid reasons to be cautious about Michelin’s
conclusion that the [Copyright] Act is consistent with section 2(b),”
and that ‘‘subsequent legal and technological developments raise
new questions about any continuing precedential value in the
Court’s section 1 analysis.”44 Craig critiques Teitelbaum J.’s
‘‘reli[ance] upon the distinction drawn in the Irwin Toy decision

40
41

42

43
44

Scassa at 959.
Craig, ‘‘Putting the Community in Communication: Dissolving the Conflict
Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright” at 95. Scassa writes that ‘‘[t]o
equate copyrights with private property rights short circuits the much more
contextual analysis required by copyright law” (at 959).
Bailey at 141; Craig, ‘‘Putting the Community in Communication: Dissolving
the Conflict Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright” at 92-94. Several
other authors have also questioned the ongoing precedential value of Michelin
in light of subsequent SCC copyright jurisprudence (Jeremy de Beer, ‘‘Legal
Strategies to Profit from Peer Production” (2008) 46 Can. Bus. L.J. 269-278;
Giuseppina D’Agostino, ‘‘Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright
Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to UK Fair Dealing and US Fair Use”
(2009) 53 McGill L.J. 309 at 329-30, 359).
Scassa at 959.
Bailey at 143-44.
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between the ‘form’ and the ‘content’ of expression,” arguing that
‘‘there is an argument to be made that the form/content divide . . . is
inapposite in the realm of copyright.”45
This article builds upon these works in a number of ways. Like
Scassa, Bailey and Craig, I critique the approach to copyright
adopted by Teitelbaum J. However, I take a different approach
than is taken in the above-mentioned works. Rather than arguing
that Teitelbaum J. ‘‘radically misconstrued the nature and purpose
of copyright law,”46 as did Craig, for instance, I am arguing instead
that Teitelbaum J., in his decision in Michelin, applied an approach
to copyright that at the time that Michelin was handed down had
been endorsed by the SCC as the correct view of copyright in
Canada, but that has since been rejected (namely the author-centric
view of copyright).
As well, like Scassa, Bailey and Craig, I critique the approach
adopted by Teitelbaum J. to the Charter analysis (both ss. 2(b) and
1). However, as above, I take a different approach than is taken in
the above-mentioned works. Rather than arguing that Teitelbaum
J. misapplied the Charter analysis, for instance, I am instead
arguing that Teitelbaum J., in his decision in Michelin, adopted
approaches to the Charter right to freedom of expression as well as
to the s. 1 analysis that at the time that Michelin was handed down
were available to him to adopt, but that have now been foreclosed
due both to subsequent SCC freedom of expression jurisprudence
as well as to the SCC’s rejection of the author-centric approach to
copyright.
In short, I am arguing that the Michelin approaches to the
intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright are no longer good law, and on this basis should be
rejected by contemporary courts considering the intersection of the
Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright.

45

46

Craig, ‘‘Putting the Community in Communication: Dissolving the Conflict
Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright” at 98.
Ibid. at 111.
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3. CANADIAN COURTS’ VIEWS OF THE CORRECT
CONCEPTIONS OF BOTH COPYRIGHT AND OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION HAVE SHIFTED OVER
TIME
(a) Copyright in Canada: From an Author-centric Conception to
a Balancing of Interests
In Canada, neither the Constitution nor the Copyright Act sets
out the purpose or objective of copyright.47 Furthermore, as Daniel
Gervais and Scassa note, neither legislative history48 nor ‘‘the
history of copyright reform in Canada” 49 provides a clear
articulation of copyright’s purpose. It has thus fallen to the
courts to articulate the purpose of copyright in Canada.
Canadian courts’ views of the correct conception of copyright
have shifted over time. During the period in which Teitelbaum J.
delivered his judgment in Michelin, the conception of copyright
endorsed by the SCC as the correct approach was one referred to by
Abella J. in SOCAN v. Bell as ‘‘author-centric”.50 Under this view
of copyright, the singular purpose of copyright is to protect
authors. Abella J. cited to Bishop v. Stevens, a 1990 decision of the
SCC, as an example of a case in which the author-centric view of
copyright was applied.51 In this decision, McLachlin J. (as she then
was) presented copyright as a set of laws the purpose of which is to
protect authors, writing that the ‘‘copyright holder” is the party
‘‘whose interests the [Copyright Act] is designed to protect.”52
McLachlin J. rooted her view of the purpose of copyright in
Canada’s copyright history, stating that:

47

48

49

50

51
52

Cf., U.S. Const., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8, which sets out the objective of copyright in
the United States.
Daniel J. Gervais, ‘‘The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada” (2005) 2
U.O.L.T.J. 315 at 318.
Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Originality and Utilitarian Works: The Uneasy Relationship
between Copyright Law and Unfair Competition” (2003-04) 1 U.O.L.T.J. 51 at
58.
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada,
2012 SCC 36 at [9].
Ibid. at [9].
Bishop v. Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467 at 483.
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The [Copyright] Act was based on, and designed to implement,
the Berne Convention of 1886 as revised in Berlin in 1908, which
set forth an international code and created a union of states ‘‘for
the protection of the rights of authors over their literary and
artistic works”.53

McLachlin J. also remarked that the Canadian Copyright Act was
based on the Copyright Act, 1911 (U.K.), stating that:
As noted by Maugham J., in Performing Right Society, Ltd. v.
Hammond’s Bradford Brewery Co., [1934] 1 Ch. 121, at p. 127,
‘‘the Copyright Act, 1911, was passed with a single object,
namely, the benefit of authors of all kinds, whether the works
were literary, dramatic or musical”.54

Abella J., in SOCAN v. Bell, described the author-centric
approach as ‘‘focus[ing] on the exclusive right of authors and
copyright owners to control how their works were used in the
marketplace.” 55 The importance, to copyright owners, of
preserving control over copyrighted works is central to
McLachlin J.’s judgment in Bishop. As McLachlin J. noted:
[F]rom a composer’s point of view, the right to control the
circumstances under which the first recording is made is crucial.
Once the composer has made or authorized a recording of his
work, he has irrevocably given up much of his control over its
presentation to the public (emphasis added).56

Also emphasized in this decision is the need for copyright holders to
have ‘‘security”, or protection against the loss of control over
copyrighted works.57
Citing to Craig, Abella J., in SOCAN v. Bell, wrote that under
the author-centric approach to copyright, ‘‘any benefit the public
might derive from the copyright system was only ‘a fortunate byproduct of private entitlement.’”58 This view — that the sole
purpose of copyright is to advance the interests of authors and their
assigns, but that in benefiting authors the public may benefit as well
53
54
55
56
57
58

Ibid. at 473.
Ibid. at 478-79.
SOCAN v. Bell at [9].
Bishop at 479.
Ibid. at 481, 482 and 483.
SOCAN v. Bell at [9], citing to Carys J. Craig, ‘‘Locke, Labour and Limiting the
Author’s Right: A Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law”
(2002) 28 Queen’s L.J. 1 at 14-15.
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— is echoed in Gibson J.’s judgment in the trial decision in CCH (a
decision handed down three years after Teitelbaum J.’s decision in
Michelin). As Gibson J. stated:
The object and purpose of the Copyright Act is to benefit
authors, albeit that in benefiting authors, it is capable of having
a substantially broader-based public benefit through the encouragement of disclosure of works for the advancement of
learning or, as in this case, the wider dissemination of law.59

The word ‘‘might” used by Abella J. in the above paragraph
carries significant weight in this context, as does the word
‘‘capable” employed by Gibson J. The use of these terms assists
in constructing an image of an approach to copyright focused
squarely on the author or their assigns, under which the public may
benefit, although there is no guarantee that it will and no
consequence or significance if it does not.
The author-centric view of copyright has now been firmly
rejected by the SCC. In its place, the SCC has outlined a conception
of copyright that accepts both that authors’ rights are limited and
that they must be balanced against the public interest.60 As noted
by Abella J. in SOCAN v. Bell, the SCC’s shift away from the
author-centric view of copyright towards a more balanced
approach began with Binnie J.’s majority judgment in The´berge.61
In this decision, Binnie J. held that rather than being motivated by
a single goal — namely to protect and benefit authors — copyright
in Canada attempts to balance multiple goals. As he wrote:
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between
promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining
a just reward for the creator (or, more accurately, to prevent
someone other than the creator from appropriating whatever
benefits may be generated).62
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CCH Canadian et al. v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1999), 179 D.L.R. (4th)
609 at [116] (F.C.T.D.).
The´berge at [30].
See SOCAN v. Bell at [9], citing to The´berge. See also Chief Justice Beverley
McLachlin, ‘‘Intellectual Property - what is it all about? (Address to the
National Judicial Institute course ‘Intellectual Property: Trademark Law,’ 19,
20 November 1992)” in Gordon F. Henderson, ed., Trade-marks Law of Canada
(Carswell, 1993).
The´berge at [30].
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In order for copyright to be effective in encouraging the creation
of certain types of works of the arts and intellect, copyright owners
must be given a fair reward. However, as noted by Binnie J., care
must be taken to ensure that copyright owners are not
overcompensated.63 To provide an excessive reward to copyright
owners would be to unnecessarily restrict the use of copyrighted
works, which, as noted by Binnie J., might ‘‘unduly limit the ability
of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative
innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole.”64
Rights granted to copyright owners, under the SCC’s balanced
approach to copyright, are limited by public interest
considerations. As noted by Binnie J. in The´berge, ‘‘[t]he proper
balance” in copyright ‘‘lies not only in recognizing the creator’s
rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature.”65 The
primary limiting mechanisms internal to the Copyright Act are
defences to copyright infringement such as fair dealing.66 Under the
SCC’s balanced approach to copyright, defences to copyright
infringement are interpreted broadly, are seen as an ‘‘integral part
of the Copyright Act,”67 are described as ‘‘user’s right[s],”68 and
have been referred to by the SCC as ‘‘[o]ne of the tools employed to
achieve the proper balance between protection and access in the
Act.”69
(b) The Charter Right to Freedom of Expression in Canada: From
a Narrower Conception to a Broader Conception
In the previous section, I described how the SCC’s view of the
purpose of copyright has shifted over time, from an approach
focused squarely on the author and their assigns to one in which
copyright is conceived of as balancing between copyright owners’
rights, users’ rights and the public interest. In a similar manner,
Canadian courts’ views of the correct approach to be taken to the
Charter right to freedom of expression have also shifted over time.
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Ibid. at [31].
Ibid. at [32].
Ibid. at [31].
Copyright Act, ss. 29-29.2.
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 at [48].
Ibid. at [48].
SOCAN v. Bell at [11].
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In the years following the enactment of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, courts struggled with a number of questions,
one of which was how narrowly or broadly should the Charter right
to freedom of expression be defined.70 Initially, some courts took
the view that the scope of the Charter right to freedom of
expression was no different than the scope of the right to freedom
of speech under the Canadian Bill of Rights (which was itself
interpreted to be no broader than the scope of freedom of speech or
expression under the common law).71 Under this approach, the
Charter was seen as having ‘‘entrench[ed] as constitutional rights
the right existing at common law associated with the words
themselves.”72
Over time, it began to be accepted by some courts that the scope
of the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression should not be
interpreted in such a narrow manner.73 However, certain courts
continued to interpret the Charter right to freedom of expression
more narrowly than did others. For instance, in Cromer, the Court
of Appeal for British Columbia held that the scope of protectable
expression could be limited or constrained by private rights,
without needing to subject these limits to a section 1 analysis.74
Other courts adopting more narrow approaches to the scope of the
paragraph 2(b) right to freedom of expression accepted that the
value of the expressive act should be considered in defining the
scope of protectable expression.75 Similarly, a number of courts
70

71

72
73

74
75

For papers that discuss the development of s. 2(b) jurisprudence, see, for
instance, Robert J. Sharpe, ‘‘Commercial Expression and the Charter” (1987)
37 U.T.L.J. 229 at 252-55; Jamie Cameron, ‘‘The Past, Present, and Future of
Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
See, for instance, R. v. Squires (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 44 (Ont. Prov. Ct. (Crim.
Div.)) and Cromer v. British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (1986), 29 D.L.R.
(4th) 641 (B.C. C.A.). In Cromer at [54], Lambert J.A. wrote that ‘‘[t]he Charter
does not purport to confer new freedoms. . . . [t]he freedom of expression itself
remains the same freedom as existed before the adoption of the Charter” (ibid.
at [54].).
R. v. Squires at [59].
See, for instance, Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario
Board of Censors (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 583 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Rocket and Rocket
College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (1998), 64 O.R. (2d) 353 (Ont. C.A.); Ford
v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
Cromer at [39].
Courts applying this approach were critical of (and ultimately rejected)
arguments that the scope of protectable expression under the Charter-protected
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accepted that freedom of expression could not be used to derogate
from property rights.76
Under this latter approach, as described by Scott Prov. Ct. J., in
R. v. Layton, ‘‘the ‘freedom of expression’ guaranteed by s. 2(b) is in
itself limited so as to fully protect both private and public property
from the impact of its operation” (emphasis in original). Scott Prov.
Ct. J. wrote that ‘‘[t]his argument . . . is founded on the contention
that the Charter does not diminish or modify any common law
rights concerning the enjoyment of property.”77
In 1989, the SCC, in Irwin Toy, adopted an approach to
freedom of expression under which the starting position for the s.
2(b) analysis is that all attempts to convey meaning are prima facie
protectable expression.78 The Irwin Toy approach — albeit slightly
modified — remains the governing approach to freedom of
expression in Canada.79
However, although the starting position under Irwin Toy is that
all attempts to convey meaning are prima facie protectable
expression, not all attempts to convey meaning will be protected
under s. 2(b) of the Charter. Dickson C.J., Lamer J. and Wilson J.,
in their majority judgment in Irwin Toy, clarified that not all forms

76
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right to freedom of expression should include types of expression such as nude
burlesque dancing, spreading false news, and communication for the purposes
of prostitution, in part on the basis that in their view, these types of expression
did not possess sufficient ‘‘social or moral value” to warrant protection under s.
2(b). See, for instance, R. v. Zundel (1987), 58 O.R. (2d) 129 (Ont. C.A.) at [57].
See, also, Re Koumoudorous and Metro Toronto, 1984 CarswellOnt 1171, 6
D.L.R. (4th) 523 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and R. v. Smith (1988), 44 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont.
H.C.). Jamie Cameron refers to this conception of the Charter right to freedom
of expression as a ‘‘definitional conception” (Jamie Cameron, ‘‘The Original
Conception of Section 1 and its Demise: A Comment on Irwin Toy Ltd v
Attorney-General of Quebec” (1989) 35 McGill L.J. 253 at 260).
See, for instance, New Brunswick Broadcasting Co., Limited v. Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission, [1984] 2 F.C. 410 (F.C.A.);
Canadian Newspapers Co. Ltd. c. Montre´al (Ville), [1988] R.J.Q. 482 (Cour
supérieure du Québec); Edmonton (City) v. Forget (1989), 99 A.R. 122 (Alta.
Prov. Ct.).
R. v. Layton, 1986 CarswellOnt 792, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 550 (Ont. Prov. Ct.),
Judicial District of York, Ontario. This argument was not accepted by Scott
Prov. Ct. J.
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Que´bec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 969.
Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1 at [156]; Socie´te´ Radio-Canada c.
Que´bec (Procureur ge´ne´ral), 2011 SCC 2 at [33]-[36].
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of expression are protected under s. 2(b) of the Charter. As they
wrote:
The content of expression can be conveyed through an infinite
variety of forms of expression: for example, the written or
spoken word, the arts, and even physical gestures or acts. While
the guarantee of free expression protects all content of expression, certainly violence as a form of expression receives no such
protection. It is not necessary here to delineate precisely when
and on what basis a form of expression chosen to convey a
meaning falls outside the sphere of the guarantee. But it is clear,
for example, that a murderer or rapist cannot invoke freedom of
expression in justification of the form of expression he has
chosen.80

Courts, both pre- and post-Irwin Toy, have also accepted that the
location of expression could justify its exclusion from protection
under s. 2(b) of the Charter.81
In recent years, the SCC has clarified the limited circumstances
in which expression can be excluded from s. 2(b). In Montre´al
(City) (a 2005 decision of the SCC), McLachlin C.J. and
Deschamps J. stated that ‘‘[e]xpressive activity should be excluded
from the protective scope of s. 2(b) only if its method or location
clearly undermines the values that underlie the guarantee.”82 As
well, in this same decision, McLachlin C.J. and Deschamps J. wrote
that, ‘‘[p]rivate property . . . will fall outside the protected sphere of
s. 2(b) absent state-imposed limits on expression, since state action
is necessary to implicate the Canadian Charter.”83 As is discussed
later in this article, this clarification is of particular significance to
the intersection of copyright and the Charter right to freedom of
expression.
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Irwin Toy at 969-70.
See, for instance, NB Broadcasting; Committee for the Commonwealth of
Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, 77 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
Montreal (Ville) v. 2952-1366 Que´bec inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 at [72], 2005
CarswellQue 9633 (S.C.C.).
Ibid. at [62].
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4. THE MICHELIN APPROACHES TO THE INTERSECTION
OF THE CHARTER RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND COPYRIGHT RELY ON NOWABANDONED CONCEPTIONS OF BOTH COPYRIGHT
AND OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Two approaches to the intersection of the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright can be identified in
Teitelbaum J.’s decision in Michelin. First, Teitelbaum J.
presented the relationship between the Charter right to freedom
of expression and copyright as one in which there is no conflict
between these rights. As Teitelbaum J. wrote, ‘‘[t]he Charter does
not confer the right to use private property — the Plaintiff’s
copyright — in the service of freedom of expression.”84 Second,
Teitelbaum J. wrote that even if he were to determine that the
provisions of the Copyright Act infringe the Charter right to
freedom of expression, that ‘‘according to the wording of Section 1,
that Sections 3 and 27 of the Copyright Act are ‘reasonable limits
prescribed by law . . . demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”85
In the following section, I argue that both Michelin approaches
to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright rely on and have been shaped by now-abandoned
conceptions of both copyright and of freedom of expression. As
such, these approaches to the intersection of the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright are no longer good law, and
should not be relied upon by contemporary courts considering the
intersection of these rights.
(a) First Michelin Approach: Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted
Expression is Prohibited Expression
Under the first Michelin approach to the intersection of the
Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright, Teitelbaum J.
rejected the idea of conflict between these two rights, concluding
that ‘‘[t]he Charter does not confer the right to use private property
— the Plaintiff’s copyright — in the service of freedom of
expression.”86 In the absence of case law directly on point,
84
85
86

Michelin at [85].
Ibid. at [115].
Ibid. at [85].
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Teitelbaum J. justified this conclusion on the basis of the following
analysis.
Having characterized copyright as private property, Teitelbaum
J. made reference to a number of cases, both pre-Charter and postCharter, in which courts concluded or in which it was remarked
that freedom of expression does not grant the right to express
oneself on private property. Teitelbaum J. then determined that ‘‘it
is reasonable to equate doing something on private property as a
forum of expression with using the property — the copyright — to
convey expression.”87 He also concluded that ‘‘[i]f form is defined
as ‘how the meaning is conveyed’. . . ‘use’ of property could
constitute a form of expression.”88
Through the course of his decision, Teitelbaum J. also engaged,
in significant depth, with Committee for the Commonwealth of
Canada v. Canada, a post-Irwin Toy decision of the SCC in which,
as described by Teitelbaum J. ‘‘the Supreme Court suggested that
choosing a public forum of expression can possibly limit the scope
of protection under paragraph 2(b).”89 Teitelbaum J. reasoned, by
analogy to this case, that ‘‘use of private property to convey
expression can also warrant removing the expression from the
protection of paragraph 2(b).”90
These determinations, informed by Dickson C.J., Lamer J. and
Wilson J.’s conclusion, in Irwin Toy, that certain ‘‘form[s] of
expression chosen to convey a meaning fall[] outside the sphere of
the guarantee,”91 led Teitelbaum J. to his ultimate conclusion that
‘‘the defendants’ expression is a prohibited form or is subject to . . .
a ‘special limitation’ and is not protected under the umbrella of
paragraph 2(b).”92
As I will argue, each step of Teitelbaum J.’s analysis, as set out
above, relies on or has been shaped by conceptions of both
copyright and the Charter right to freedom of expression that have
now been rejected, namely the author-centric view of copyright as
well as a conception of freedom of expression under which it is
87
88
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90
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92

Ibid. at [101].
Ibid. at [87].
Ibid. at [88].
Ibid. at [88].
Irwin Toy at 970.
Michelin at [87].
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accepted that property rights are insulated from operation of the
Charter.
(i) Copyright is Private Property
Teitelbaum J.’s characterization of copyright as private
property was critical to his articulation of the first Michelin
approach to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of
expression and copyright, in that it allowed Teitelbaum J. to link
his analysis of whether the use of copyrighted expression constitutes
prohibited expression under s. 2(b), to a line of cases, both preCharter and post-Charter, in which courts including the SCC either
concluded or remarked that freedom of expression does not grant
the right to express oneself on private property. These cases, along
with Commonwealth (discussed in further depth in Part 4.(a)(v),
below), serve as the jurisprudential foundation for Teitelbaum J.’s
ultimate determination that the Charter right to freedom of
expression does not protect the unauthorized use of copyrighted
expression.
Teitelbaum J.’s characterization of copyright as a private
property right flows from his adoption of the author-centric
approach to copyright. Despite Estey J.’s statement, in Compo Co.
Ltd. v. Blue Crest Music et al., that ‘‘copyright is neither tort law
nor property law in classification, but is statutory law,”93 a number
of Canadian courts, including the SCC, have referred to copyright
as a property right.94 Two recent SCC decisions in which this term
was employed, for instance, are Cinar Corporation, in which
McLachlin C.J., writing for the court, characterized the
infringement of copyright in that case as ‘‘a breach of Robinson’s
property rights”;95 and Canadian Artists’ Representation v. National
Gallery of Canada, in which Rothstein J., writing for the court,
referred to ‘‘licensing or assigning the copyright in an existing
work” as ‘‘simply a transfer of property.”96
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Compo Co. Ltd. v. Blue Crest Music (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357 at 372 (S.C.C.).
In addition to the references below, see Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada
Inc., 2007 SCC 37 at [27]-[29]; Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 363,
2006 SCC 43 at [56].
Cinar at [102].
Canadian Artists’ Representation v. National Gallery of Canada, 2014 SCC 42 at
[9].
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Very few Canadian cases, however, have referred to copyright as
private property. Despite Teitelbaum J.’s statement that his
characterization of copyright as a private property right is the
‘‘usual characterization of copyright,” 97 a search of both
proprietary and publicly-available case law databases suggests
that in only four Canadian decisions is copyright referred to in such
a manner.98 Of these decisions, three can be linked directly to
Michelin: one of these decisions is Michelin, and two are decisions
in which the reference to copyright as private property is contained
within a quote from Michelin.99
While the question of whether copyright is a property right
continues to ‘‘ignite passionate debate,” as noted by Pascale
Chapdelaine,100 the mere characterization of copyright as a
property right does not in and of itself point to any specific
conclusion regarding the nature or scope of copyright.101 The
nominalist school of property law scholarship, for instance, takes
the view that property is a ‘‘purely conventional concept with no
fixed meaning — an empty vessel that can be filled by each legal
97

Michelin at [96].
On May 9, 2017, I conducted a search of both a proprietary research database
(Quicklaw) and a freely available research database (CanLII). No search
limitations other than the terms ‘‘copyright /20 ‘private property’” were used.
The search on Quicklaw (within the All Canadian Court Cases database)
returned four results: ibid. (Michelin); Canwest 2008; Fraser Health Authority v.
Hospital Employees’ Union; and Warner Bros.-Seven Arts Ltd. v. CESM-TV
Ltd., [1971] Ex. C.J. No. 6. The search on CanLII returned three results:
Michelin; Canwest 2008; and Fraser Health Authority v. Hospital Employees’
Union.
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Michelin; Fraser Health Authority v. Hospital Employees’ Union; Canwest 2008.
The fourth decision, Warner, is a decision of the Exchequer Court of Canada,
handed down in 1971.
100
Pascale Chapdelaine, ‘‘The Property Attributes of Copyright” (2014) 10 Buff.
Intell. Prop. L.J. 34 at 36. See, for instance, David Vaver, ‘‘General
Introduction” in David Vaver, ed., Intellectual Property Rights: Critical
Concepts in Law Vol. 1 (Routledge, 2006) at 1-19; William F. Patry, Moral
Panics and the Copyright Wars (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 103; Julie
Cohen, ‘‘Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy” (2011) 2011
Wis. L. Rev. 141; Adam Mossoff, ‘‘Is Copyright Property?” (2005) 42 San
Diego L. Rev. 29; Lior Zemer, ‘‘What Copyright Is: Time to Remember the
Basics” (2006) 4 Buff. Intell. Prop. L.J. 54.
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Cf., L. Ray Patterson, ‘‘Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use” (1987) 40 Vand.
L. Rev. 1 at 9, cited in Craig, ‘‘Putting the Community in Communication:
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system in according with [sic] its particular values and beliefs.”102
Under this approach, to state that copyright is a property right is
just the beginning, and not the end, of any discussion as to the
nature or scope of copyright. Thus, the SCC’s use of the term
property rights in its more recent copyright jurisprudence is not
necessarily inconsistent with a balanced approach to copyright, and
need not be seen as a movement away from such an approach.
The same cannot be said of the explicit characterization of
copyright as private property. Craig writes that conceptualizing
copyright as a private property right ‘‘recast[s copyright] . . . as a
system for the protection of private individuals’ rights against the
world, its primary purpose being the protection of copyright
owners’ property.”103 Similarly, William Patry writes that ‘‘[b]y
describing copyright as a private property right, proponents of the
description hope to get policy makers and courts to believe that
only private, and not public rights are implicated.”104
In focusing attention squarely on the author and their assigns,
the conception of copyright as private property is inconsistent with
the balanced approach currently endorsed by the SCC as the
correct conception of copyright, under which copyright owners’
rights are limited by users’ rights as well as public interest
considerations. In the absence of additional qualifying language
acknowledging the range of interests engaged by copyright laws, it
would be inappropriate, under the balanced approach to copyright,
for courts to refer to copyright as private property.
However, as noted above, the approach to copyright endorsed
by the SCC during the period in which Michelin was handed down
was not the balanced approach, but the author-centric approach.
The characterization of copyright as private property, while
inconsistent with the balanced approach to copyright, is
consistent with and flows from Teitelbaum J.’s adoption of the
author-centric approach to copyright, under which copyright is
solely a matter of private interest.
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Thomas R. Merrill, ‘‘Property and the Right to Exclude” (1998) 77 Neb. L. Rev.
730 at 737.
103
Craig, supra note 101 at 94. Craig also writes that ‘‘[b]y characterizing copyright
as private property pure and simple, the court obscures the nature of copyright
as speech regulation” (ibid. at 97).
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(ii) Freedom of Expression Does Not Confer the Right to Express
Oneself on Private Property
Having characterized copyright as private property, Teitelbaum
J., in answering the question of whether core provisions of the
Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe section 2(b) of the Charter,
drew support from a number of cases, both pre-Charter and postCharter, in which courts concluded or in which it was remarked
that freedom of expression does not confer the right to express
oneself on private property, namely: Committee for the
Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada (Commonwealth); New
Brunswick Broadcasting Co., Limited v. Canadian Radio-television
and Telecommunication Commission (New Brunswick); and
Harrison v. Carswell (Harrison).105
Passages drawn by Teitelbaum J. from these cases reflect an
approach to freedom of expression under which private property,
the protection of which is characterized as a fundamental freedom,
is insulated from the operation of the Charter. For instance,
Teitelbaum J. referenced a passage from Dickson J.’s majority
judgment in Harrison — a pre-Charter decision — in which
Dickson J. noted that ‘‘Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence has
traditionally recognized, as a fundamental freedom, the right of
the individual to the enjoyment of property and the right not to be
deprived thereof, or any interest therein, save by due process of
law.”106 This statement presents the right to enjoy property as a
‘‘fundamental freedom”; one that if it is to be limited, must be done
explicitly by legislatures (that is to say, not by courts through
judicial interpretation).107 Philip Girard and Jim Phillips describe
Harrison as representing the view that ‘‘[p]roperty rights are a
powerful trope, and invariably win the day over other societal
values, even though property remains formally outside the
Charter.”108
105

Commonwealth; New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of
the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319; Harrison v. Carswell (1975), [1976]
2 S.C.R. 200.
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Harrison at 219.
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Ibid. at 219.
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Philip Girard & Jim Phillips, ‘‘A Certain Mallaise: Harrison v Carswell,
Shopping Centre Picketing, and the Limits of the Postwar Settlement” in J.
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Teitelbaum J. also referenced a passage from Thurlow C.J.’s
judgment in New Brunswick (a decision handed down by the
Federal Court of Appeal after the Charter had come into force but
prior to the SCC’s decision in Irwin Toy) that, quoted in full,
suggests that property rights are insulated from Charter scrutiny:
The freedom guaranteed by the Charter is a freedom to express
and communicate ideas without restraint, whether orally or in
print or by other means of communication. It is not a freedom
to use someone else’s property to do so. It gives no right to
anyone to use someone else’s land or platform to make a speech,
or someone else’s printing press to publish his ideas. It gives no
right to anyone to enter and use a public building for such
purposes . . . the freedom guaranteed by paragraph 2(b) does
not include a right for anyone to use the property of another or
public property, the use of which was subject to and governed
by the provisions of a statute.109

This passage evokes the majority decision in Harrison, in which the
protection of property is presented as a fundamental freedom.110
Last, with respect to Commonwealth, Teitelbaum J. referenced
McLachlin J.’s statement, in obiter, that:
Freedom of expression . . . has not historically conferred a right
to use another’s private property as a forum for expression. A
proprietor has had the right to determine who uses his or her
property and for what purpose. Moreover, the Charter does not
extend to private actions. It is therefore clear that s. 2(b) confers
no right to use private property as a forum for expression. 111

While one reason given by McLachlin J. for the exclusion of
expression taking place on private property from the scope of
freedom of expression is the fact that ‘‘the Charter does not extend
to private actions,” this justification for the exclusion of expression
taking place on private property from the scope of freedom of
expression, by virtue of its placement as the second justification in
the paragraph, as well as the use of the conjunctive adverb
‘‘moreover” to link these two justifications, can be seen at most to
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be of equal weight to the first justification, namely the historical
exclusion or insulation of private property from freedom of
expression scrutiny.112
Teitelbaum J. also referenced L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s statement, in
Commonwealth, that:
If the government had complete discretion to treat its property
as would a private citizen, it could differentiate on the basis of
content, or choose between particular viewpoints and grant
access to sidewalks, streets, parks, the courthouse lawn, and
even Parliament Hill only to those whose message accorded with
the government’s preferences.113

In a manner similar to Dickson J.’s statement from Harrison set out
above, L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s remarks suggest that private property
owners have ‘‘sole and despotic dominion”114 over their property,
and, armed with this complete and limitless freedom, can grant or
deny access as they wish, regardless of the impact on other
individuals’ freedom of expression rights.
These references, taken together, present a view of private
property as being insulated from Charter scrutiny. Consistent with
this, they suggest that private property owners should be able to
control who expresses themselves on their property (or with their
property), and for what purposes, regardless of the impact that
silencing or expelling any non-owning party may have on the
expression interests either of the party engaged in the expressive act
or the public more generally.
During the period in which Michelin was handed down, it was
unclear whether and the extent to which expression taking place on
(or using) private property is protected under section 2(b) of the
Charter. As such, it was open to Teitelbaum J. to draw connections
between the facts before him and the cases described above, and to
rely on these cases as support for his conclusion that the
unauthorized use of copyrighted expression can be excluded from
the scope of protection under section 2(b) of the Charter.
Since Michelin was handed down, however, the SCC has
provided additional guidance with respect to the question of
whether and the extent to which expression taking place on private
112
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property is protected under section 2(b). As noted above, in
Montre´al (City), McLachlin C.J. and Deschamps J. clarified that
while expression taking place on private property is generally
excluded from Charter scrutiny, the reason for this exclusion is the
absence of government action.115 In situations where there is
government action, the Charter is engaged, regardless of whether
private property rights are involved.116
Copyright, as a set of rights created by legislation, constitutes
government action.117 Thus, contrary to the view conveyed by the
passages described above, even if copyright is considered to be a
private property right, due to the nature of copyright as a ‘‘creature
of statute,”118 the provisions of the Copyright Act remain subject to
Charter scrutiny.119 As such, a contemporary court considering the
intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright would not be able to rely on the cases described above as
authority for the view that acts involving the unauthorized use of
copyrighted expression should be excluded from the scope of
protectable expression under section 2(b).
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(iii) The Use of Private Property as a Forum for Expression can be
Equated to the Use of Copyright to Convey Expression
Another element critical to the first Michelin approach to the
intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright is Teitelbaum J.’s conclusion that ‘‘it is reasonable to
equate doing something on private property as a forum for
expression with using the property — the copyright — to convey
expression.”120 This conclusion helps justify Teitelbaum J.’s
reliance, as authority, on the cases described in Part 4.(a)(ii), in
which courts remarked or concluded that freedom of expression
does not convey the right to express oneself on private property.
As I will argue, however, Teitelbaum J.’s conclusion that the use
of copyrighted works to convey expression can be equated to the
use of private property as a forum for expression was shaped by his
adoption of the author-centric view of copyright, and as such
should not be adopted by contemporary courts considering the
intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright.
In his judgment, Teitelbaum J. acknowledged that copyright is
an intangible property right. However, he chose not to focus on the
differences between intangible property and tangible property that
might lead a court to conclude that the use of private property as a
forum for expression cannot be equated to the use of copyrighted
works to convey expression.121
In a manner that evokes the author-centric approach to
copyright with its focus on copyright owner control, Teitelbaum
J. instead presented the status of copyright as intangible property as
a challenge that copyright owners must overcome in seeking to
protect their private property rights, writing that because copyright
is intangible property, ‘‘[t]he owner therefore has a more
120
121
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challenging task in asserting his or her control over the use of the
property.”122
Teitelbaum J. also wrote that ‘‘just because [copyright] is
intangible, it should not be any less worthy of protection as a full
property right.”123 In support of this latter statement, Teitelbaum J.
referenced Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football)
Ltd., a 1964 decision from the U.K. House of Lords.124 After
referencing Ladbroke, Teitelbaum J. went on to note that:
It may be easier to focus on the nature of the plaintiff’s property
right in the copyright if we imagine the case of an infringer
dealing with a painting, a piece of tangible private property that
like the copyright is already imbued with meaning. No infringer
could credibly allege that freedom of expression gives him or her
the right to subvert the content or message of the painting by
physically drawing a moustache on the painting. However, what
if the infringer asserted the right to copy or substantially
reproduce the painting with a moustache? Our instincts might
not be so certain about the scope of the infringer’s freedom of
expression because our perceptions are coloured by the
intangible nature of the copyholder’s right. We should guard
against our instincts in this instance since they might lead us to
undervalue the nature of the plaintiff’s copyright and overestimate the breadth of the defendants’ freedom of expression.125

This paragraph echoes a passage in Lord Devlin’s judgment in
Ladbroke, not directly quoted in Michelin, in which Lord Devlin
noted that:
If a wine merchant, it was argued, selected a dozen different
wines as having in combination a special appeal, and arranged
the bottles together in a shop window, there was nothing to
prevent a rival trader copying the arrangement. Ought it to
make any difference if, instead of a shop window arrangement,
the merchant makes a list? My lords, I think with respect that
this argument is based on a fundamental misapprehension of the
law of copyright. The law does not impinge on freedom of trade;
it protects property. It is no more an interference with trade
than is the law against larceny. Free trade does not require that
one man should be allowed to appropriate without payment the
122
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fruits of another’s labour, whether they are tangible or
intangible. The law has not found it possible to give full
protection to the intangible. But it can protect the intangible in
certain states, and one of them is when it is expressed in words
and print. The fact that that protection is of necessity limited is
no argument for diminishing it further; and it is nothing to the
point to say that either side of the protective limits a man can
obtain gratis whatever his ideas of honesty permit him to pick
up.126

The passage quoted above from Teitelbaum J.’s judgment
suggests that — like Lord Devlin in the context of freedom of trade
— Teitelbaum J. viewed the defendants’ arguments that freedom of
expression should act to limit the protection otherwise provided by
copyright as ‘‘based on a fundamental misapprehension of the law
of copyright.”127 To Teitelbaum J., applying an author-centric view
of copyright, copyright is a system of laws that was enacted for a
single purpose: to protect and reward authors. The protection
granted to authors is, in practical terms, limited by the intangible
nature of copyright, one consequence of which is that noncopyright owning parties can, in many contexts and with relative
ease, make unauthorized copies or reproductions of works (for
instance the Bibendum leaflets).
Given the ease of making reproductions of copyrighted
expression, one might assume that this or related acts are
encompassed within the section 2(b) right to freedom of
expression. Teitelbaum J. urged the reader to ‘‘guard against our
instincts in this instance.”128 Rather, in Teitelbaum J.’s view, in
order to provide effective protection for authors, as is required
under the Copyright Act as interpreted through the lens of the
author-centric view, it is necessary to look past copyright’s
intangible nature and to treat it as one would treat ‘‘a full
property right”;129 that is to say, to treat copyright in a similar
manner to other types of property rights by granting broad rights
of control to copyright owners over the unauthorized use of
copyrighted expression.
However, although it may have been open to Teitelbaum J.,
applying an author-centric approach to copyright, to equate
126
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copyright to privately-owned real and to personal property rights,
it is not appropriate for contemporary courts to take this step.
Given the extent to which this aspect of Teitelbaum J.’s decision
relies both on the characterization of copyright as a private
property right as well as on a view of copyright as focusing on
copyright owner control, to adopt this aspect of Teitelbaum J.’s
decision would be to ‘‘[over]value the nature of the plaintiff’s
copyright and [under]estimate the breadth of the defendants’
freedom of expression” (the opposite error to that warned of by
Teitelbaum J.).130
(iv) The Use of Copyright Constitutes a Form of Expression
As noted above, Dickson C.J., Lamer J. and Wilson J., in their
majority judgment in Irwin Toy, held that ‘‘[w]hile the guarantee of
free expression protects all content of expression,” certain ‘‘form[s]
of expression chosen to convey a meaning fall[] outside the sphere
of the guarantee.”131 Building upon this passage, Teitelbaum J.
concluded that ‘‘[i]f form is defined as ‘how the meaning is
conveyed’, it seems as if ‘use’ of property could constitute a form of
expression.”132 This conclusion, which was open to Teitelbaum J.
to reach given the uncertainty following Irwin Toy regarding the
circumstances in which expression could be excluded from the
scope of section 2(b) on the basis of the form of expression,
provided further support for his ultimate determination that the
unauthorized use of copyrighted expression is not protected under
the section 2(b) right to freedom of expression.
However, as is the case with the other key elements of the first
Michelin approach, Teitelbaum J.’s conclusion that ‘‘‘use’ of
property could constitute a form of expression,”133 as well as his
application of this conclusion in the context of copyright, relies on
and was shaped by his adoption of the now-abandoned authorcentric view of copyright. As such, it should not be relied on by
contemporary courts considering the intersection of the Charter
right to freedom of expression and copyright.
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In Michelin, Teitelbaum J. referred to Bibendum as a ‘‘vehicle
for the defendants’ message.”134 Conceiving of a work such as
Bibendum as a vehicle for conveying a message, as opposed to an
element of the message itself, helps to justify continued copyright
owner control over the copyrighted work (a key element of the
author-centric approach). If the copyrighted work is only a vehicle
used to convey a message, then it is unnecessary for parties to use
the copyrighted work in order to successfully communicate their
message. They can simply convey their message in an alternative
way (one that does not infringe upon the copyright owner’s
exclusive rights). Under this approach, the use of copyrighted
expression to convey a message is only form, and not content.
However, the key assumption that animates Teitelbaum J.’s
approach to the form/content divide is that it is possible, in the
context of copyright, to separate form from content. This
assumption can be challenged. As Craig writes:
Simply on the basis of [a] superficial overview of copyright
doctrines, it is easy to see on what grounds one could criticize
the form/content distinction in its application to copyright.
Whether an expression assumes a copyrightable form, and
whether a particular use constitutes an infringement of copyrighted material, are both questions whose answers must be
determined with reference to the expression’s content. 135

As well, in Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal
Code (a 1990 decision of the SCC), for instance, Lamer J. wrote
that:
[F]orm and content are often connected. In some instances they
are inextricably linked. One such example is language. . . . Art
may be yet another example of where form and content
intersect. Is it really possible to conceive, for instance, of the
content of a piece of music, a painting, a dance, a play or a film
without reference to the manner or form in which it is
presented? It seems to me that just as language colours the
content of writing or speech, artistic forms colour and indeed
help to define the product of artistic expression. . . . I am of the
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view, therefore, that art and language are two examples where
content and form are inextricably linked, and as a result both
merit protection under s. 2 (b) of the Charter.136

Applying Lamer J.’s approach to the form/content divide, in light
of Craig’s critique, it can be argued that a contemporary court
applying a balanced approach to copyright might conclude,
contrary to Michelin, that all copyrighted works ‘‘merit
protection under s. 2(b) of the Charter” on the basis that their
‘‘content and form are inextricably linked.”137
(v) The Commonwealth Tests: Lamer C.J. and McLachlin J.
In considering whether the defendants’ use of Bibendum should
be protected under section 2(b) of the Charter, Teitelbaum J.
engaged, to a significant degree, with the SCC’s decision in
Commonwealth. During the period in which Michelin was handed
down, Commonwealth was the leading SCC decision to consider the
issue of whether and the extent to which expression on public
property is protected under section 2(b).138
Teitelbaum J.’s engagement with Commonwealth, however,
should not be seen as his acceptance of the idea that copyright is
public property, or that copyright is a set of rights one goal of
which is to protect or advance the public interest. As Teitelbaum J.
wrote, ‘‘I can find no merit in the defendants’ characterization of
the plaintiff’s copyright as a piece of quasi-public property.”139
Rather, Teitelbaum J.’s engagement with Commonwealth
provided further support for his conclusion that the use of
copyrighted expression, as private property, constitutes prohibited
expression. As he noted:
Chief Justice Lamer in Commonwealth, supra, stated that the
necessary balancing of the parties’ interests in cases of a party
asserting the right to use public property occurs before the
136
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section 1 analysis. I have expanded this principle to conclude
that a similar but stricter balancing of interests is to occur if the
party, like the defendants in the case at bar, asserts the right to
use private property.140

Seven judges of the SCC heard arguments in Commonwealth.
Six judgments were handed down. Three of these judgments —
those of Lamer C.J., McLachlin J. (as she then was), and
L’Heureux-Dubé J. — set out distinct approaches to the question
of whether and the extent to which section 2(b) of the Charter
protects expression on public property. Teitelbaum J. focused his
analysis on the approach outlined by Lamer C.J. on the basis of his
view that Lamer C.J.’s approach had been applied most often in
subsequent decisions.141 Teitelbaum J. also applied the approach
set out in McLachlin J.’s judgment, noting that both McLachlin J.’s
approach and Lamer C.J.’s approach had the support of three SCC
judges in Commonwealth.142 Ultimately, Teitelbaum J. concluded
— on the basis of both Lamer C.J.’s and McLachlin J.’s approaches
— that the defendants’ expression is not protected under section
2(b) of the Charter.143
As I will argue in this part, the manner in which Teitelbaum J.
applied both Lamer C.J. and McLachlin J.’s approaches from
Commonwealth flows from and is consistent with both the authorcentric approach to copyright as well as by the approach to
freedom of expression under which it is accepted that property
rights are insulated from the operation of the Charter. As such,
Teitelbaum J.’s application of Commonwealth should not be
followed by contemporary courts considering the intersection of
the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright.
(b) Lamer C.J.’s approach in Commonwealth, Applied
Teitelbaum J. summarized Lamer C.J.’s approach in
Commonwealth as follows:
140
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the Court, in determining the scope of the individual’s right to
free expression on government property under paragraph 2(b),
should first balance the government’s interest in public property
with the individual’s right to free expression on that property.
Only if the expression is compatible with the primary function
of the property is the expression within the protected sphere of
paragraph 2(b).144

Applying this approach in the context of the defendants’
unauthorized use of copyrighted expression, Teitelbaum J. wrote
that:
If freedom of expression in a public forum is limited by such
factors as the function of the place, the conditions and
restrictions for using private property should be even stronger.
By analogy to Chief Justice Lamer’s reasoning on the use of
public property, I hold that a person using the private property
of another like a copyright, must demonstrate that his or her use
of the property is compatible with the function of the property
before the Court can deem the use a protected form of
expression under the Charter.145

Teitelbaum J.’s description of the function of copyright as well
as his characterization of the defendants’ use of the specific
copyrighted expression (Bibendum) were both shaped by his
application of the author-centric approach to copyright.
Teitelbaum J. described the function of copyright as to ‘‘present
the original author’s intent of a favourable corporate image or
provide an incentive for compensating artists for the integrity of
their vision.”146 This description is consistent with the authorcentric approach to copyright, in that it both portrays copyright as
being singularly focused on the rights of copyright owners, as well
as emphasizing copyright owner control over the work’s message. It
is inconsistent, however, with the balanced approach to copyright,
under which users have the right to engage in certain unauthorized
uses of works,147 some of which may disrupt, unsettle, or conflict
with the intended message of the original author.
Teitelbaum J.’s discussion of the defendants’ use of Bibendum
also flows from his application of the author-centric approach to
copyright. Throughout the course of his decision, Teitelbaum J.
144
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portrayed the CAW et al.’s actions in a negative light, at one point
analogizing their actions to an ‘‘infringer [who] asserted the right to
copy or substantially reproduce [a] painting with a moustache.”148
Under a balanced approach to copyright, this characterization of
the alleged infringer — as nothing more than a juvenile mischiefmaker or vandal — would be inappropriate. As Paul Goldstein has
written in relation to the intersection of the First Amendment and
copyright in the United States:
Satisfaction of the public interest in access [to a diverse range of
intellectual expression] requires adherence to what might appear
to be a drastic perspective: that copyright infringement serves a
healthy function and deserves to be encouraged. The infringer
is, in any case, the sole proponent of the generalized interest in
access; for courts to prejudice his position with assumptions of
infringement’s intrinsic badness would significantly impede
vindication of the public interest.149

In Canada, the balanced approach to copyright should require
courts to refrain from making ‘‘assumptions of infringement’s
intrinsic badness” in order to avoid ‘‘imped[ing] vindication of the
public interest.”150 Under the author-centric view, however, as
noted above, the public interest is not a relevant consideration.
Under this view of copyright, the infringer represents not ‘‘the sole
proponent of the generalized interest in access” but rather an
individual whose actions threaten the interests of authors and their
assigns — the parties whose interests the Copyright Act was
designed to protect.151
Furthermore, Teitelbaum J. also presented the defendants’ use
as an appropriation of the plaintiff’s copyright interest, writing that
the defendants’ actions ‘‘deprived the plaintiff of its property.”152
This statement suggests that copyright owners, as owners of private
property, are entitled to control all uses of their copyrighted works
save those explicitly provided for in copyright legislation (the
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specific provisions of which are to be interpreted narrowly so as to
not unfairly derogate from owners’ private property rights).153
Although consistent with the author-centric approach to
copyright, this statement is inconsistent with the balanced
approach to copyright, under which many unauthorized uses of
copyrighted expression are seen not as deprivations of a property
interest but as acts that both advance the public interest and that
are considered users’ rights. As such, this aspect of Teitelbaum J.’s
decision should also be rejected by contemporary courts
considering the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of
expression and copyright.
(c) McLachlin J.’s Approach in Commonwealth, Applied
Teitelbaum J. summarized McLachlin J.’s approach in
Commonwealth as follows:
Justice McLachlin held at page 229 [of Commonwealth] that the
right of free expression on government property is not a given
and must meet certain conditions. At pages 238-239, Justice
McLachlin specified that the individual asserting such a right of
access has to prove that the expression furthers one of the
purposes of free expression first defined in Irwin Toy, supra, at
page 976 as: (i) seeking truth; (ii) fostering participation in the
organs and means of social and political decision-making; and
(iii) enhancing the diversity of the means of individual selffulfilment.154

Although stating that ‘‘this test from Commonwealth is not
directly applicable to the case at bar since it concerns the use of
public property as a forum for expression,” Teitelbaum J.
proceeded with his application of McLachlin J.’s approach on the
basis that ‘‘it elaborates a helpful principle for distinguishing the
nature of the parties’ interests in this case” (namely the question of
whether the defendants’ use is consistent with the values underlying
freedom of expression).155 In so doing, the impact of the authorcentric approach on Teitelbaum J.’s articulation of the intersection
of the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright is again
made clear.
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While acknowledging that ‘‘there was certainly a link between
the defendants’ leaflets and brochures that did not depict the
‘Bibendum’ and the value of expression enhancing participation in
social and political decision-making” (emphasis added), Teitelbaum
J. rejected the idea that the CAW et al.’s use of Bibendum furthered
the purposes underlying freedom of expression.156 In particular,
Teitelbaum J. focused on the third purpose of freedom of
expression identified in Irwin Toy, stating that:
The defendants had no need to adopt a form of expression, the
use of copyrighted material, that deprived the plaintiff of its
property and actually subverted the third value of promoting
the diversity of ideas. In other words, if copyright is not
respected and protected, the creative energies of authors and
artists in furthering the diversity of ideas will not be adequately
compensated or recognized.157

This conclusion flows from Teitelbaum J.’s application of the
author-centric approach to copyright. Under a system where the
singular goal of copyright is to protect and reward authors, and
where the primary mechanism of doing so is by granting authors
broad rights of control over copyrighted works and over the
authors’ message contained therein, then maintaining copyright
owner control over copyrighted works — for instance by enjoining
unauthorized uses of works such as the CAW et al.’s modified
version of Bibendum — is critical to ensuring both creativity and
diversity of ideas.
Teitelbaum J.’s characterization of CAW et al.’s use of
Bibendum as an attack or an act of vandalism is consistent with
such an approach to copyright. It is inconsistent, however, with the
balanced approach to copyright, under which it is accepted that
non-copyright owning parties have broad rights to engage in
unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, and that creativity is
fueled not only by providing robust protection for copyright
owners’ rights (see Cinar Corp.,158 for instance) but also by
providing robust protection for users’ rights.
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(d) Second Michelin Approach: Any Infringement is Justified
Under a Section 1 Analysis
In the previous section, I argued that the first Michelin approach
to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright, as articulated by Teitelbaum J., relies upon and was
shaped — in a number of ways — by Teitelbaum J.’s application of
the now-abandoned author-centric view of copyright in concert
with an approach to freedom of expression, now foreclosed, under
which it is accepted that property rights are insulated from
operation of the Charter.
In a similar manner, Teitelbaum J.’s application of the second
Michelin approach, under which any conflict that may exist
between copyright and the section 2(b) right to freedom of
expression is defused by mechanisms internal to copyright, at
least to the point of satisfying a section 1 analysis,159 has also been
shaped by these now-rejected conceptions of both copyright and of
freedom of expression. As such, as is the case with the first Michelin
approach, Teitelbaum J.’s analysis, which led him to the conclusion
that ‘‘sections 3 and 27 of the Copyright Act are ‘reasonable limits
prescribed by law . . . demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society’,” should also be rejected by contemporary
Canadian courts considering this intersection.160
As described above, under the Irwin Toy test, once it is
determined that a government action infringes section 2(b) in
purpose or effect, and that there is no reason to exclude the
expression from the scope of protection under the Charter, the onus
shifts to the government to justify the infringement under section 1
of the Charter. Teitelbaum J. summarized the section 1 test as
follows:
There are three prongs to what Chief Justice Dickson in Oakes,
at page 139, called the proportionality test: (i) rational connection of the law’s objectives to the means; (ii) minimal impairment of the infringed Charter right; and (iii) proportion in the
effects of the means and the objectives.161

As I will describe in further detail below, Teitelbaum J.’s
application of each of these three prongs was shaped by his
159
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adoption of now-abandoned approaches to both copyright and to
freedom of expression.162
(i) There is a Rational Connection Between the Law’s Objectives and
the Means Chosen to Achieve those Objectives
In Michelin, Teitelbaum J. accepted that ‘‘the objectives of the
Copyright Act are rationally connected to an action for copyright
infringement” on the basis that a link exists ‘‘between the goal of
protecting the interests of authors and copyright holders” and the
means of achieving this goal, namely ‘‘by granting [authors and
copyright holders] a monopoly on the right to use and reproduce
their works and the ability to enforce those interests in an action for
copyright infringement.”163
Teitelbaum J.’s application of the rational connection part of
the proportionality test was shaped in two ways by his adoption of
the author-centric approach to copyright. First, Teitelbaum J.’s
statement that the objectives of the Copyright Act are to ‘‘protect[]
the interests of authors and copyright holders” is consistent with
the author-centric view of copyright, under which the sole purpose
of copyright is to protect and reward authors and their assigns.164
Conversely, this statement is inconsistent with the conception of
copyright currently endorsed by the SCC as the correct approach
(the balanced approach), under which the reward granted to
copyright owners must be balanced with both users’ rights and the
public interest.165
Second, Teitelbaum J.’s description of the means of achieving
these objectives, namely by granting authors and copyright holders
‘‘a monopoly on the right to use and reproduce their works” — is
also consistent with an author-centric approach to copyright.166
Specifically, Teitelbaum J.’s use of the term ‘‘monopoly”,
162
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particularly in the absence of any language confirming the rights of
non-copyright owning parties to make certain unauthorized uses of
copyrighted works, or acknowledging that copyright owners’ rights
are limited (language which might be expected should the balanced
approach be applied), is rooted in an approach to copyright that is
focused solely on the private rights of copyright owners.167 As well,
the use of the term monopoly without any qualifiers such as limited
or statutory, for instance, suggests an expansive approach to
copyright owners’ rights that, although consistent with the authorcentric approach to copyright, is inconsistent with the balanced
approach.
(ii) The Impugned Provisions are Minimally Impairing of the
Defendants’ Rights
With respect to the second prong of the section 1 analysis,
Teitelbaum J. determined that the impugned provisions of the
Copyright Act, if they are held to infringe the defendants’ Charter
right to freedom of expression, are minimally impairing of the
defendants’ rights. He reached this conclusion on the basis that the
Copyright Act permits ‘‘attacks on the authors of works or their
ideas,” that ‘‘infringers” may reproduce parts of works that are not
substantial without attracting liability, and that the Copyright Act
contains exceptions to copyright infringement set out in subsections
27(2) and (3).168
Like his application of the rational connection test, Teitelbaum
J.’s application of the minimal impairment part of the
proportionality test was also shaped by his adoption of the
author-centric approach to copyright. For instance, Teitelbaum
167
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J.’s statement that the Copyright Act permits ‘‘attacks on the
authors of works or their ideas,”169 a statement made in support of
his conclusion that the Copyright Act minimally impairs the rights
of non-copyright owning parties, suggests that he viewed the CAW
et al.’s unauthorized use of the copyrighted Bibendum design as an
attack — an aggressive, anti-social and violent act that should be
given social sanction — as opposed to a legitimate attempt to
convey a critical message. This view of the CAW et al.’s use of
Bibendum is consistent with an approach to copyright focused
squarely on the rights of authors and their assigns, and under which
unauthorized use is portrayed as both an unjustified trespass and as
an act that does lasting damage to the plaintiff’s copyright.170 It is
inconsistent with the balanced approach to copyright, under which
users are seen as having the right to engage in certain unauthorized
uses of copyrighted works.171
As well, Teitelbaum J.’s statement that ‘‘[c]opyright . . .
minimally impairs the defendants’ right of free expression by the
very well-tailored structure of the Copyright Act with its list of
exceptions in subsections 27(2) and (3)” is also consistent with an
author-centric approach to copyright.172 Nowhere in his decision
does Teitelbaum J. discuss how the exceptions in subsections 27(2)
and (3) contribute to or support the expression interests of noncopyright owning parties, or which aspects of these exceptions are
particularly important (or essential) in this regard.173 Based on
Teitelbaum J.’s comments, it appears as if it is the mere presence of
exceptions to copyright infringement, rather than any particular
aspect of them (or any particular exception) — alongside a need to
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give Parliament a ‘‘‘margin of appreciation’ in evaluating whether
the impugned act minimally impairs the Charter right in question”
— that is sufficient to persuade Teitelbaum J. that this aspect of the
proportionality test is satisfied.174
This aspect of Teitelbaum J.’s decision is consistent with the
author-centric approach to copyright, an approach to copyright
focused squarely on the copyright owner, and under which
exceptions to copyright infringement are seen as derogations
from copyright owners’ rights. It is inconsistent, however, with
the balanced approach to copyright, under which defences to
copyright infringement are seen as users’ rights, or as elements
essential to the proper functioning of the Copyright Act.175
(iii) The Benefits of the Impugned Provisions of the Copyright Act
Outweigh their Deleterious Effects
Last, Teitelbaum J. held that the benefits of the impugned
provisions of the Copyright Act outweigh their deleterious effects.
In his judgment, Teitelbaum J. described the benefits of the
impugned provisions as providing protection for authors and
helping to ‘‘compensate[] [and] recognize[]” the ‘‘creative energies of
authors and artists in furthering the diversity of ideas.”176 This
articulation of copyright’s benefits, which focuses solely on the
ways through which copyright protects authors and rewards their
creativity, flows from and is consistent with an author-centric view
of copyright. No mention is made, for instance, of the benefits of
the impugned provisions for a vibrant public domain, or the public
interest more generally, as would be expected under a balanced
approach.177
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In describing the deleterious effects of the impugned provisions,
Teitelbaum J. wrote that:
The plaintiff offered into evidence a wealth of union antiMichelin pamphlets and brochures that did not use the
plaintiff’s property in violation of the Copyright Act. (Exhibit
P-26). A prohibition on using the plaintiff’s ‘Bibendum’ copyright does not therefore create undue hardship for the defendants in conveying their message to the Michelin workers.178

In implying that undue hardship might only be found where there is
no other way through which a party could convey a message except
through the unauthorized use of copyrighted expression, this
passage is consistent with the author-centric view of copyright: one
focused solely on the interests of authors and their assigns, and
under which users’ rights or the public interest are not relevant
considerations.
It is inconsistent, however, with the balanced approach to
copyright, under which non-copyright owning parties have rights to
engage in certain unauthorized uses of works, and under which the
‘‘proper balance between protection and access” is a core copyright
consideration.179
5. CONCLUSION
Michelin is a case firmly rooted in the era in which it was heard
and handed down. Presented with arguments that core provisions
of the Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to
freedom of expression, and in the absence of governing authority
directly on point, Teitelbaum J. adopted a conception of copyright
that at the time arguments in Michelin were being heard had been
endorsed by the SCC as the correct approach to copyright (the
author-centric view). Teitelbaum J. also relied on and sought
copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability
of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the
long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper
utilization” (The´berge at [32]).
178
Michelin at [98].
179
SOCAN v. Bell at [11]. Bailey argues that ‘‘particularly in light of the dual
legislative objectives articulated by the SCC in The´berge”, Teitelbaum J.’s
judgment in Michelin ‘‘may both underestimate the deleterious impacts of the
Act on free expression and overestimate its efficacy in achieving its objectives”
(Bailey at 155).
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assistance from decisions handed down by leading Canadian courts
that had considered the question of whether and the extent to which
the section 2(b) right to freedom of expression protects expression
on private and public property, and that can be read as suggesting
that private property is insulated from Charter scrutiny. Teitelbaum
J.’s adoption of these conceptions of both copyright and freedom of
expression played a critical role in shaping both Michelin
approaches to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of
expression and copyright.
In the years since Michelin was handed down, a number of
developments have occurred with respect to Canadian copyright
jurisprudence. Beginning in 2002, for instance, the SCC began to
move away from the author-centric view of copyright in favour of a
balanced approach under which the rights of copyright owners are
acknowledged to be limited, and must be balanced with the public’s
interest in accessing and using expression.180 In 2012, the authorcentric view was referred to by the SCC as the ‘‘former framework”
for copyright.181
As well, in the years since Michelin was handed down, the SCC
has provided further clarity with respect to specific aspects of the
section 2(b) analysis, including the question of whether and the
extent to which expression may be excluded from the scope of
section 2(b) on the basis of its location, as well as the basis on which
this determination is to be made. It is now clear that the reason why
private property rights are generally excluded from Charter scrutiny
is because of the absence of government action, and not because of
any special characteristic of property that insulates it from Charter
scrutiny.182
Despite these judicial developments, however, Canadian courts
have continued to cite, on a regular basis over the past two decades,
to the conclusions reached in Michelin with respect to the
relationship between the Charter right to freedom of expression
and copyright; conclusions which rely on and have been shaped by
conceptions of both copyright and of the Charter right to freedom
of expression that although once valid, have now been rejected.
In this article, I have argued that it is no longer acceptable for
Canadian courts, when faced with arguments that specific
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provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the
Charter right to freedom of expression, to dismiss these arguments
on the basis that they have been addressed, and settled, in Michelin.
Shaped as they have been by now-abandoned conceptions of both
copyright and of freedom of expression, the Michelin approaches to
the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright are no longer good law.
If not the Michelin approaches, then what? How should the
relationship between the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright be structured? A fulsome explanation of the different
ways through which the relationship between the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright could be structured using
contemporary articulations of both freedom of expression and
copyright is beyond the scope of this article.183 Rather, the goal of
this article has been to create a space within which such
reconsideration can occur by demonstrating the extent to which
the Michelin approaches to the intersection of the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright have been shaped by nowabandoned conceptions of both copyright and of freedom of
expression; and, as a result, to highlight the inappropriateness of
courts’ continued reliance on Michelin as authority in this area.
Too much is at stake, with respect to the intersection of the
Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright, to assume
that with the passage of time, Michelin will fall out of favour. While
copyright supports, encourages and incentivizes the creation and
dissemination of expression, it has also been used by governments,
corporations, institutions and individuals, to stifle expression.184
To the extent to which Michelin prevents Charter challenges from
moving forward, in the context of copyright, due to nowabandoned approaches to both copyright and to the Charter
right to freedom of expression, it must be explicitly rejected.
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